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Scholars and policy makers believe that democracy will bring prosperity through 
integration into the global economy via increased international trade. This study tests 
two theories as to why democracies might trade more. First, political freedom may be 
correlated with economic freedom, thus prompting higher levels of economic activity, 
thereby driving states to trade more. Second, democracy implies higher quality 
governance either through institutions or policy-making procedures. I utilize a bilateral 
gravity trade model covering approximately 150 countries from 1950 to 1999, with 
fixed effects for time, importers and exporters. I find the theory that democracy, and 
many of its components, promotes international trade unconvincing. Economic freedom 
does not have the expected impact on international trade levels, but quality of 




Keywords: trade, democracy, governance, Africa, gravity model 
JEL classification: F1, O17, P16  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu  publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Rosaleen McDonnell. 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
 
Tables are at the end of the paper. 
 
   1
1. Introduction 
The appeal of democracy is enhanced if democracies also provide greater income because of 
greater international trade (Oneal and Russett 1997; Oneal et al. 1996). Empirical studies that 
have investigated the relation between democracy and trade have studied dyadic pairs and 
major trading countries utilizing small samples, which introduces a number of biases 
(Morrow et al. 1998). Although bilateral trade of two democratic countries may be greater 
than that of other pairs of countries, this does not indicate that democratic countries 
necessarily trade more than non-democratic countries: a conclusion about the effect of 
democracy is made to depend on a country’s trading partners rather than isolating the effect 
of democracy itself (Dai 2006). By relying on the relationship between two countries rather 
than the effect of democracy on a country, the use of dyadic pairs thus asks a different 
question than whether democracy increases trade. 
 
In this study, I re-examine the relation between democracy and international trade. I 
investigate two propositions about why democracies might trade more. First, the political 
freedom of democracies may be associated with economic freedom, which promotes 
international trade. Second, democracy provides better institutions or policy-making 
procedures: in particular, property rights protection is superior and corruption is in general 
lower. My approach differs from previous studies in focusing on importing or exporting-
country democratic variables independent of the trading partner and on the transmission 
mechanism that might increase trade. I utilize a bilateral gravity trade model covering 
approximately 150 countries from 1950 to 1999, with fixed effects for time, importers and 
exporters. The Goteborg University Quality of Governance Time Series Database allows me 
to study how democracy, economic freedom, and institutions influence international trade. By 
‘searching for significance in the residual’ of the gravity model, I test whether democratic 
states trade more than autocracies. 
 
The conclusions do not support necessary linkage between democracy and international trade. 
The coefficients are the theoretically correct sign; however, many are statistically or 
economically insignificant and fragile to changes in modelling or data. Economic freedom 
does not have the expected effect on international trade levels, although the quality-of-
governance variables have broad economic and statistical significance. As the example of 
China in itself indicates, democracy does not appear to be the necessary promoter of 
international trade that others have claimed. Indeed, mercantilist countries, which are in 
general not democratic, usually engage in substantial although unbalanced international 
trade.1 Theory offers no reason why democracy in itself should increase trade if property 
rights are protected and contractual obligations are honoured. 
2.  The theory of international trade and democracy 
The empirical research linking international trade and democracy (Rogowski 1987; Mansfield 
and Busch 1995; Bliss and Russett 1998; Mansfield et al. 2000), by focusing on dyadic trade, 
has not considered how democracy affects trade in one country. The use of dyadic trade data 
                                                 
1 For a recent investigation of mercantilism, see for example Congleton and Lee (2009).   2
links the consequences of democracy in both countries and proposes military alliances, 
language and trade agreements as reasons for greater trade. There are methodological reasons 
why looking at dyadic trade obscures the results. 
  
First, focusing on dyads introduces a rich country bias: international trade typically involves a 
rich democratized country in the pair, thereby biasing results upward because of bilateral 
trade agreements, security agreements, and culture (Long 2003; Dixon and Moon 1993; 
Gowa and Mansfield 1993). Also, geographic proximity can affect conflict and thereby trade 
(Robsdt et al. 2007). Because income affects trade (Linder 1961), low-income democratic 
pairs reduce the democracy and trade relation (although low-income countries are generally 
not democratic; see Borooah and Paldam 2007). The data that I use cover a larger number of 
years and countries than have been previously studied, reducing the possibility of sample 
selection bias when focusing on countries with observed levels of trade or rich countries in 
close proximity. The problem of sample selection bias in the previous literature linking 
international trade and democracy cannot be discarded as most studies focused on high-
income or culturally similar states. My study uses the largest samples of states, time and 
income levels in evaluating the relationship between democracy and international trade. 
Second, previous studies omitted important variables or methods. Third, whether pairs of 
democracies trade more, while empirically interesting, is a subtly different question from 
whether democratic states trade more: a better test is whether democracies trade more than 
non-democracies, corrected for the different income consequences of democratic and non-
democratic institutions. 
  
Whether governments permit free trade or choose protectionist policies is also related to 
institutions, as indicated by theories of the political economy of protection (Hillman, 1989, 
2001; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Goldberg and Maggi 1997; O’Reilly 2005; Kono 2006; 
Yu 2006). Also, governments link aid policies and exports of capital goods to recipient states 
(Younas 2008). Whether a democracy is presidential or parliamentary also seems to affect 
international trade levels (Ang et al. 2005; Roelfsema 2004; Nielson 2003). Research 
indicates that democracy has little to no impact on economic growth and may even restrain it 
past certain levels of income primarily in higher income countries (Rodrik and Wacziarg 
2005; Baum and Lake 2003). Similarly, others have argued that increased levels of trade 
openness and foreign investment negatively impact democracy (Li and Reuveny 2003). The 
conflicting findings about the impact of democracy on international trade are influenced by 
the divergent impact of political actors across regime types. Democracy allows groups that 
may seek to restrict imports to gather and support politicians sympathetic to their viewpoint 
while autocracy allows more outright corruption in political decisions.  
 
Two arguments are made by proponents of the argument that democracies trade more. First, 
political freedom causes economic freedom. Empirically, this requires that democratic 
variables are proxies for economic freedom. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the 
Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index and the Freedom House Political Rights 
Index.2 
 
                                                 
2 In this plot on the Political Freedom axis, ‘1’ is free and ‘7’ is not free. On the Economic Freedom axis ‘100’ 
is considered free and ‘0’ is considered not free. Therefore, points in the upper left hand corner are both 
politically and economically free while those in the lower right hand corner are not free.   3

































Source: The Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index and the Freedom House Political Rights Index 
 
Second, democracy is related to improved governance, policy-making, regulation and the rule 
of law. As politicians become increasingly accountable to the electorate, the democratic 
process provides the openness and transparency that allows businessmen to increase 
economic activity with the knowledge that their activities will be subject to predictable laws 
and regulatory frameworks. One is hard put to find examples of well-governed, non-corrupt, 
non-democratic states; the outstanding example is Singapore. Empirically, using an 
instrumental variable in the place of democracy, it should be possible to detect the effects of 
institutional, rule of law or regulatory quality measures on international trade, if economic 
activity depends on these variables. There is reported evidence that democracy, through well 
functioning institutions, promotes efficient allocation of resources and higher satisfaction 
with democracy (Wagner et al. 2009). Looking at a broad measure of the quality of 
governance, first glances are not promising. Figure 2 implies only a weak relationship 
between the quality of governance and democracy when using the International Country Risk 
Guide Quality of Governance and the Polity IV dataset. 
   4
Figure 2: Democracy and quality of governance 
 
Source: The International Country Risk Guide Quality of Governance and the Polity IV dataset 
3.  Data and methodology 
The data is from Andrew Rose (2003) downloaded from his website.3 Rose uses a bilateral 
gravity model controlling for the ‘natural’ determinants of trade.4 The STATA dataset covers 
177 countries with controls for natural variables such as distance, GDP and land area. It also 
includes a comprehensive set of dummy variables that control for such variables as common 
language between the trading pair, colonial history and geographic factors such as landlocked 
countries. International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade data was extracted from the online 
database Webstract for the years 1950 to 1999.5 The natural log of real imports for the 
importing country was arrived at by averaging the exports of country two with the imports of 
country one, deflating by the 1982-84 Urban Consumer CPI, and taking the natural log. As 
noted, time series democratic variables were extracted from the Quality of Government and 
Polity IV datasets. The Quality of Government Institute (QOG) at the University of Goteborg 
compiled a wide variety of democracy and related measures of the overall quality of 
government from different datasets. The QOG variables are used to compare against the 
Polity IV where possible and study potential transmission mechanisms, and test whether 
references to democracy in fact proxy for other measures of freedom or institutional 
considerations.  
                                                 
3 To download the data, paper drafts, and supporting output for STATA go to: haas.berkley.edu/arose.  
4 The gravity model has been used by a wide variety of authors to study a wide variety of trade issues (Feenstra 
et al. 2000; Rose and Spiegel 2003; Anderson and van Wincoop 2004, 2004; Feenstra 2002; Glick and Rose 
2001; Rose 2003, 2004b; Frankel and Romer 1999). 
5 Please note that in my dataset due to direction of trade data, not all countries from the Rose data set have been 
included. For instance Bhutan, Namibia, and Swaziland were not included as there were not four trade numbers 
from which to arrive at an average of two import data statistics.   5
 
A number of methodological issues should be mentioned. First, I use imports rather than 
average real trade. This allows me to isolate the impact on exporters or importers. 
  
Second, country one import data was averaged with country two export data and vice versa. 
This produced two numbers: average country one imports and exports or averaged country 
two exports and imports. The country two imports, or country one exports, were then inserted 
as the dependent variable and all necessary variables inverted. This change has two major 
effects. First, it significantly enlarges the dataset. Rose has 234,597 observations of overall 
trade; this change creates a dataset when merging with Polity IV democracy variables 
consisting of 326,483 observations. 
 
Second, this permits an examination of the impact of democracy on imports and exports. 
Many trading relationships, especially ones involving low- income countries, have goods 
moving in one direction but not both: that is, there is unbalanced trade. There are different 
incentive structures when trade takes place with a significantly larger or smaller partner 
(Polachek et al. 1999). Where real imports equal zero, the natural log of one was used as the 
import value. In other words, many observations of real trade are zero or lower.6 This 
accurately reflects actual trade observations, without excluding the lack of trade as a non-
observation and has been used previously where real trade observations equal zero 
(Eichengreen and Irwin 1995). 
  
Third, I run regressions with fixed importer and exporter effects. Failure to include fixed 
importer and exporter effects reduces the tendency to overestimate coefficients. Research has 
noted that utilizing a gravity model without comprehensive fixed effects or friction variables 
may not correctly estimate key variables (Feenstra 2002; Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003). 
An international border unquestionably brings about additional variables that impact the flow 
of trade as demonstrated most notably by McCallum (1995). McCallum, omitting fixed 
importer and exporter effects, found an implausible 2,200 per cent increase in intra-Canadian 
trade due to the border with the United States. As others have demonstrated, including 
country effects changes the results but will provide more moderate results and a better 
estimation of the data (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Feenstra 2002; Egger 2000, 2002; 
Matyas 1997, 1998). To the best of the author’s knowledge, no other research studying the 
relationship between international trade and democracy has utilized fixed year, importer and 
exporter effects. I seek to correct this oversight. 
 
Fourth, measures of democracy remain inherently subjective snap shots. Statistics on 
democracy remain qualitative variables that do not capture the same meaning as observed 
statistics of distance or GDP. Scholars have sought to rectify this by using instrumental 
variables highly correlated with democracy such as the death penalty or related factors (Yu 
2006; Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway 2003). However, in a separate study comparing three 
measures of democracy with high level of correlation, each measure of democracy produces 
different results (Casper and Tufis 2002). As the results here indicate, measures of democracy 
that attempt to capture the same qualitative phenomenon may produce different results. 
Though the empirical evidence that democracy positively affects international trade is 
lacking, it may stem from the inability of measures of democracy to properly capture and 
quantify it. 
                                                 
6 The natural log of small numbers is negative therefore many observations of real imports are negative 
observations. 12.8 per cent of all observations of the natural log of real imports were zero or below.   6
 
Fifth and finally, work to date studying international trade and democracy has failed to fully 
correct for the role of income. Some cross-country studies of trade and democracy have 
focused on major powers and rich democracies (Morrow et al. 1998). Democracy and income 
are strongly correlated, with income levels acting as a primary inhibitor to democracy 
(Borooah and Paldam 2007). Most international trade involves at least one rich country, a 
democracy. This failure to correct for these empirical issues has biased results upward and 
consequently found that democracy has a large and statistically significant impact. Other 
bilateral gravity model studies have demonstrated that when the impact of rich countries is 
controlled for, the cross-country significance drops dramatically and heads to zero for middle 
and low- income countries (Subramanian and Wei 2006). I control for the impact of income, 
isolating democracy and international trade. 
4. The  model 
I utilize a standard gravity equation model. To distinguish the importance of democracy on 
imports and exports, it is necessary to control for the potential range of democracy within 
each country. The basic model will be specified as follows: 
 
Ln(Mijt) = lnDij + ln(AreaiAreaj) + ln(YiYj) + ln(YiYj/PopiPopj) + Langij + Borderij + Landlij + 
Islandij + ComColij + CurColij + Colonyij + Comctryij + Custrictijt + FTAijt + Tt + MDemi + 
XDemj  
where i and j denote trading partners, t denotes times, and the variables are:7 
  
  Mijt is the real imports of i from j at time t  
  D is the distance between i and j 
  Y is real GDP 
  Pop is population 
  Lang is a dummy variable which is unity if i and j have a common language 
  Border is a dummy variable which is unity if i and j share a land border 
  Landl is the number of land locked countries in the country pair (0,1,2) 
  Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0,1,2) 
  Area is the area of the country (in square kilometers) 
  Comcol is a dummy variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 
with the same colonizer 
  Curcol is a dummy variable which is unity if i is a colony of j at time t or vice versa 
  Colony is a dummy variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa 
  Comctry is a dummy variable which is unity if i and j were a part of the same country 
at some point during the sample 
  Custrict is a dummy variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t 
  FTA is a dummy variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trading 
agreement 
  T is a comprehensive set of annual time ‘fixed effects’ with one dummy per year 
                                                 
7 The models, variables, dataset and descriptions are almost completely from Rose (2003) except as noted 
previously.   7
  MDem is a measure of democracy in the importing country i at time t 
  XDem is a measure of democracy in the exporting country j at time t 
 
This model disaggregates trade into the impact of democracy on importers and exporters. The 
regressions utilized an importer or exporter democratic variable, but not both simultaneously. 
Taking this approach, I seek to isolate the impact of democracy rather than introducing 
controls for the political regime of the trading partner.  
5.1 The  results 
The biggest result is no result at all. The baseline results, presented in Table 1, indicate that 
though the democracy variables have a statistically significant impact on trade, the economic 
impact is minimal. Before turning to the democracy variables, it is important to note in brief 
that the gravity variables returned the expected results in line with the literature.8 The 
coefficient for distance was large and negative while that for GDP was large and positive.9 
The gravity model preformed as expected. The interesting portion of the model came from 
the democracy variables. The baseline results come from three democratic variables. The first 
is a democratic index on a scale of 0 to 10 with a 10 indicating complete democracy. The 
second is an autocratic index on a scale of 0 to 10 with a 10 indicating complete autocracy. 
The third is a combination of the democratic and autocratic indexes which equals the 
democratic score minus the autocratic score and it is called the Polity index. This last index 
ranges from –10 to 10. Though this last index may seem redundant it is worth emphasizing 
that most countries throughout the world have some democratic features as well as some 
autocratic features. 
 
The democracy variables taken from the Polity IV database indicate that democracy has a 
statistically significant but economically minimal impact on international trade. As expected, 
democracy increases trade while autocracy has no economically or statistically significant 
impact on trade. The polity index returns coefficients that are almost zero with the only 
economically significant variable indicating that if a country went from absolute autocracy to 
absolute democracy exports would increase 2 per cent.10 Finally, though the coefficients 
return the expected sign and demonstrate statistical significance, this should be considered 
based upon the amount of data used. The statistical significance and economic insignificance 
imply that democracy is statistically significant because of the sample size.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Table 1 does not present the results of all baseline regressions as all basic gravity model variables such as 
distance and GDP returned nearly identical coefficients across regressions. The focus of this study is on the 
democratic, autocratic and polity variables rather than the impact of distance. 
9 It is worth noting and emphasizing that due to econometric issues not every variable will appear in each 
variation of the model especially between the perturbations with and without country effects. This is in keeping 
with the gravity model literature and observation of plausibility. It is worth emphasizing that there is a 
significant degree of similarity between the regressions with or without fixed country effects. 
10 It is worth noting that the gravity model in the absence of fixed country effects returned some rather large 
returns to certain variables. In fact many users of the gravity model now include fixed country effects to 
moderate implausibly large returns on variables. In fact the Polity Exporter variable comes back close to zero 
indicating the coefficient without fixed country effects should be taken with a grain of salt.   8
5.2  A second level of variables 
Included in the Polity IV database are variables associated with the characteristics of 
democracy. There are a few basic points that need to be made about the results. First, the 
basic result is that the coefficients are economically and statistically insignificant. Even at 
high levels, they would only increase imports by 2 per cent. Second, even though they claim 
to measure different aspects of the democratic process, all variables from the Polity IV 
dataset such as Executive Constraints and Regulation of Participation, except Durability, 
presented in Table 2 perform similarly in the gravity model. Though these variables attempt 
to measure different aspects of the democratic process, they do not appear to succeed. Third, 
the lack of statistical or economic significance is not necessarily a negative finding. There is 
little political science or economic reasoning to believe that the democratic characteristics, 
presented in Table 2, would have a significant impact on trade except in rather indirect ways, 
and the results support that. For instance, there is little reason to expect that the 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment would significantly and directly impact imports or 
exports and I find little economic impact. 
5.3  Democracy and the rest of the story 
Literature argues that democracy positively impacts trade implies that democracy has an 
indirect effect through economic freedom or quality of governance (Paldam 2003; De Haan 
and Sturm 2003). In Table 3, I present a range of variables taken from the Quality of 
Government dataset. These are variables that proxy for democracy via their correlation with 
characteristics one would associate with an open and free government. Though I do not 
present every government-related variable from the QOG dataset, the results are broadly 
representative. Also, just because a coefficient is negative does not mean a negative 
relationship between democracy and trade due to the scaling relationship used in the specific 
variable. There are some broad patterns and interesting results. First, while the coefficient 
signs are what would be expected, the consistency of economic or statistical significance is 
underwhelming. Statistical significance for democratic related variables is achieved in 
roughly two-thirds of cases while, similar to the Polity IV results, economic significance is 
lacking in other cases. Second, many of the coefficients, when comparing between imports 
and exports, are either signed differently or insignificant. When counting economic and 
statistical insignificance, 20 of the 27 coefficients have either opposite signed import and 
export coefficients or at least one insignificant coefficient. This implies that democracy and 
its characteristics may not be as unequivocally good at raising trade as argued and may 
potentially cause overall trade to cancel out if imports and exports move in opposite 
directions. 
  
Taking a closer look, however, some of the coefficients lend themselves to logical 
explanations. First, the freedom of association type variables which come from CIRI indicate 
that civil liberties increase imports but have either a negative or insignificant impact on 
exports. It may be possible that societies when exposed to freedom desire foreign goods, but 
there would seem little reason for freedom of association to drive exports. Second, 
Transparency International corruption coefficients are insignificant while World Bank 
corruption statistics are negative, economically and statistically significant, reducing imports 
but driving exports. As research indicates, governments may sell the rights to export through 
either formal or informal means (Congleton and Lee 2009). Research indicates that   9
corruption harms growth via the reduction in investment, collusive behaviour, and 
international trade and these results support those conclusions (Gatti 2004; Habib and 
Zurawicki 2002; Mauro 1995). Open and democratic governments tend to have lower 
corruption levels, reducing the growth and trade-reducing effects. Third, legal and economic 
security variables are largely insignificant for imports but have a large impact on exports. 
Fraser Institute, Heritage Foundation, and World Bank variables have no effect on imports 
while increasing exports. This makes economic sense as exporters to Country A care little 
about the legal framework in Country A and more about the credit worthiness of their trading 
partner. Conversely, an exporter from Country A will be significantly impacted if they face 
potential expropriation or harassment while attempting to export their goods abroad not faced 
by a company in a well-governed country. Fourth, the quality of governance results have a 
range of coefficients on imports but are generally economically and statistically significant on 
exports. There are a few potential factors at work. Governance will have little impact on 
import demand and instead would flow through via increased income indirectly raising 
imports. Governments, even of the democratic variety, tend to dislike imports while actively 
promoting exports which may explain the divergence in import and export coefficients. 
Furthermore, these findings bolster research indicating that democracy has a positive but 
fragile relationship to income, while institutional quality is much more robust (Rigobon and 
Rodrik 2005). Fifth, economic freedom appears to have no impact on levels of international 
trade. The one consistent variable that impacts international trade is quality of governance 
measures.  
5.4  The income effect 
Studies on trade and democracy have failed to adequately control for income levels. 
Countries with higher income levels will have higher levels of international trade (Linder 
1961; Rose 2004). However, counter-factual examples of lower income and less democratic 
states such as China and Singapore have made the relationship between democracy, income 
and trade questionable. Research has found that when differences in income levels are 
controlled for in the gravity model, the impact across countries drops considerably or 
disappears completely (Subramanian and Wei 2006). When I control for the interaction of 
income levels and democracy, using a variety of interaction terms and data exclusions, I find 
the positive effects of democracy relating directly to income levels diminish (see Table 4). 
Rich countries have economically and statistically significant gains from trade with all the 
coefficients signed as expected. Middle and low-income countries have mostly insignificant 
coefficients and some theoretically incorrect signs. Middle and low-income autocracies have 
positive export coefficients, though only significant at the five per cent level. The 
democracies that demonstrate the most consistent gains from trade during the period under 
consideration are rich democracies. The hypothesis that international trade and democracy are 
related is highly dependent on income level.  
5.5  Democratic transitions: the before and after effect 
Results are presented in Table 5 of democratic transitions. When democratic, or autocratic, 
transitions occur do we witness significant shifts in their level of international trade? The 
results, while providing some support for this argument, are not overwhelming. To focus 
more clearly on the impact of democracy, three additional types of variables were created.   10
First, one and two-year lagged variables were created to test the importance of establishing 
democracy; second, increases or decreases in democratic variables including democratic or 
autocratic transitions; and third, country regressions focused on countries that experienced 
large and sudden changes in their democracies. These new variables seek to target the 
countries and time periods which endured large changes in their polity score, either becoming 
more autocratic or more democratic, to test if large movements are more important than 
incremental change. Positive changes towards improved democracy may involve decreased 
conflict while many states that become more autocratic suffer from higher levels of conflict 
as well as many other problems that prevent international trade. States that endured changes 
in their democratic polity scores promoted a wide range of economic policy from varieties of 
socialism to free market, export-oriented growth policies. The policy orientation of 
developing states, especially those involved in large democratic transitions, significantly 
influenced their economic development objectives and targets impacting their international 
trade levels. 
 
The results are mixed. First, lagged variables demonstrate statistical significance but little 
economic significance. While the results provide the expected sign, the economic and 
statistical significance is minimal. Second, I used differences between the current democratic 
variable and lagged variables to measure the impact of changes in democratic standing. This 
was further broken down into two separate variables. The first was simple year to year 
differences where most observations captured small movements. In the second instance, we 
excluded year to year fluctuations focusing on democratic or autocratic transitions where 
polity data differed significantly year to year. The variables measuring yearly differences in 
democracy returned economically and statistically insignificant results. When excluding the 
small year to year differences, the transitions to democracy indicate borderline statistical 
significance but transitions to autocracy clearly demonstrate economically and statistically 
significant drops in international trade. Moving from autocracy to democracy does not 
indicate higher trade levels, but moving from democracy to autocracy means lower trade. 
Third, when focusing on specific countries that experienced transitions, the results back up 
the cross country data of somewhat positive but inconsistent results. Some of the countries 
significantly increase trade after democratic transitions and others experience significant 
decreases in trade under democracy.  
 
As indicated in Table 5, European countries such as Spain and Portugal increased trade under 
democracy while Uganda and Zimbabwe traded less. Brazil, while trading more was barely 
significant at the 10 per cent level. While Spain and Portugal made democratic transitions and 
joined the European Union with significant infrastructure already in place, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe enjoyed none of those benefits, as landlocked African countries surrounded by 
poor conflict-prone states. The evidence supports the idea that democracy is economically 
positive but only weakly. 
5.6  Trade, democracy, and governance in the African context 
Research has studied the link between democracy and trade, specifically focusing on 
developing countries and Africa. Some of the strongest proponents of the importance of 
institutions find only a small impact for institutions and only over long time horizons while 
others acknowledge the value of institutions but point to other factors driving trade (Sachs 
2003; Dollar and Kraay 2002). Research also provides mixed results on the impact of trade 
liberalization in the context of developing countries (Winters 2004; Winters et al. 2004;   11
Wacziarg and Welch 2002; Greenway et al. 1997). As one paper noted, there is a broad 
divergence between country welfare outcomes, ‘highlighting the links between the structure 
of poverty and the national impacts of trade liberalization’ (Hertel et al. 2003). This argument 
in support of the relationship between free markets, democracy and institutions confuses it 
with the actual promotion of trade or overlooks the negative externalities of democracy such 
as political pay-offs to promote liberalization (Milner and Kubota 2005; Adsera and Boix 
2003). Democracy and free trade without accompanying political and economic reforms do 
not bring about the expected increase in growth. 
 
A complicating factor of the development and governance question, with regards to Africa, is 
its donor aid relationships. Due to donor aid relationships, economic reform may be more 
difficult without democratization efforts that may not necessarily have the requisite 
institutional framework to establish sound governance and economic management 
(Brautigam and Knack 2004). Aid donors exercise significant influence on economic and 
political reform, specifically on matters of international trade and democratization (Ancharaz 
2003). Some research argues that increased donor flows reduce democratic accountability 
reducing the intended impact of aid inflows, though this result is widely debated (Moss et al. 
2006; Dunning 2004; Goldsmith 2001; and Knack 2001). The emphasis on good governance 
however may reduce the political sphere in Africa towards a technocratic management 
reducing the availability for democratic engagement (Campbell 2001). Democracy, while 
valuable in pure normative terms, may not yield the expected economic benefits without 
additional governance and organizational inputs. The results presented here imply that the 
quality of governance, regardless of its democratic orientation, is better at promoting 
international trade. 
 
The developmental planning for Africa has been predicated on the supposed link between 
democracy and international trade. Foreign aid was conditioned upon democratic transitions 
and the regularity of elections for autocratic regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. The support for 
democracy in Africa, however, is nuanced and more than a function of economic growth 
(Bratton and Mattes 2001). The evidence that democracy increases international trade and 
growth in Africa however, is thin. Research indicates that international trade factors which 
positively impact other regions, fail to demonstrate the same economic or statistical 
significance in Africa (Asiedu 2001). Democracy may positively impact economic 
governance in sub-Saharan Africa but only under specific conditions (Alence 2004). The 
political economy literature points to mixed results on the relationship between democracy, 
institutions and macroeconomic policy in Africa (Humphreys and Bates 2002; Ndulu and 
O’Connell 1999). Similar results to this study, through higher investment flows, have been 
found to be related to governance and administrative quality in North Africa (Aysan et al. 
2007). However, research that does find a positive relationship between growth and 
institutions does so only under certain conditions and at certain levels (Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Ndikumana 2007). Development organizations and scholars are looking for silver bullets to 
drive economic growth, especially in Africa. The results from this study and other studies 
however, appear to indicate a more nuanced and less direct relationship. The quality of 
governance and management by a government is difficult to measure and requires large 
amounts of human capital rather than the binary existence of elections. The nebulous 
meaning of the quality of governance makes it more difficult for aid organizations and 
scholars, but improves the decision-making ability of domestic governments. The relationship 
between increased international trade and democracy in Africa depends on the governance 
quality.   12
6. Conclusions 
The evidence supporting the claim that democracy increases international trade is fragile, 
principally for two reasons. First, ‘democracy’ is a weak proxy for attributes of underlying 
institutions that provide well-run government. When using more explicit measurements of 
what democracy represents rather than broad measures, the results indicate international trade 
is promoted by a well-managed and governed economic environment. Second, previous 
research has failed to properly estimate the gravity equation and has therefore overestimated 
the impact of democracy on international trade levels. The inclusion of fixed importer, 
exporter and time effects allows for proper estimation of the gravity model. We can conclude 
that evidence of the claim relating democracy to international trade is weak and the relation is 
not robust.    13
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Note: Robust coefficients with standard error in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s computations. 
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Table 2: Additional democracy variables 


















































Source: Author’s computations. 
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Table 3: The rest of the story 
 Importing  Country  Exporting  Country 
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Table 3: The rest of the story cont. 






















Source: Author’s computations. 
 
 
Table 4: The income effect 
 Importer  Exporter 
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Table 5: Democratic transitions 
 Importer  Exporter 
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***Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level *Significant at the 1% level. All regressions with fixed 
importer, exporter, and year effects with standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s computations.   18
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